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transfer of realty without providing any substantial benefits to either
spouse. The remedy for this situation calls for an amendment to the
present constitution, which, with respect to this requirement, seems
both illogical and outmoded.
ANN H. PHILLIPs
Federal Jurisdiction-Three Judge Courts-Abstention-
Appellate Jurisdiction
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein' makes two sig-
nificant decisions dealing with the jurisdiction of three judge courts
and appeal from a district court's denial to convene such a court.
The result is to simplify and clarify this area of federal jurisdiction.
A novel feature of our judicial system, the three judge federal
court is an important buffer in the conflict of state and federal law.
A three judge court is properly convened when petitioner seeks to
enjoin the enforcement of a state or federal statute as being un-
constitutional.2 If the case is proper the district judge certifies the
case to the chief judge of the circuit, who convenes the special
court. The full court includes in its three members one circuit
judge and the district judge before whom the case is pending."
Appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court.'
The three judge court was created by Congress in response to
public demand. Ex Parte Young5 held that a single federal district
judge could enjoin a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional
1370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per .uriam).
2 "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any
officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an
order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State
statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon
the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application
therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under
section 2284 of this title." 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1958). 28 U.S.C. §2282
(1958) applies the same rule to federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1958)
outlines the composition and procedure of the three judge court. Other
actions requiring a three judge court are cases seeking to set aside an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1950) and to en-
join a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act in which an expediting cer-
tificate has been filed by the U.S. Attorney General, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 15
U.S.C. § 28 (1958).
328 U.S.C. § 2284(1) (1958).
'28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958). Direct appeal is allowed because of the
dignity of the special court and the cases are generally of extreme im-
portance. See 47 Gro. L.J. 161, 169 (1958).209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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state statute. That a single federal district judge could overturn
state legislation was a great affront to state pride and dignity.6
Further, "legislative history . . . indicates that the three judge
court sections . . .were enacted to prevent a single federal judge
from being able to paralyze totally the operation of an entire regu-
latory scheme, either state or federal, by issuance of a broad in-
junctive order." 7
Judicial interpretation has limited the jurisdiction of these
courts. The statutes creating them are not a statement of broad
social policy but are to be strictly construed.8 There must be a
substantial federal question-if the statute is clearly constitutional9
or unconstitutional" the district judge is not required to call a three
judge court. Petitioner must attack the constitutionality of the
statute itself; an allegation of unconstitutional application is in-
sufficient.11 However a three judge court may assume jurisdiction
of collateral issues if properly joined with an allegation that the
statute is unconstitutional.' 2 An injunction must be sought," and a
statewide statute must be attacked, not a local ordinance.' 4 Nor do
three judges hear counterclaims 5 or contempt actions,', or cases
involving only private litigants.'7
The single district judge before whom the case is first presented
has limited power. He can only determine whether the case pre-
sented comes within the statutory requirements for a three judge
court, whether the complaint alleges a basis for equitable relief,
' Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. REV. 795 (1934).
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
'Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
'E.g., California Water Serv. Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252(1938); Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) (per curiam).
10 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam); Baily
v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam). See 50 CALIF. L. REv. 728(1962).
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
12 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73
(1960); cf. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
"Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Harlan v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 180 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Penn. 1960).
" Rorich v. Board of Comm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 307 U.S.
208 (1939); Ex Parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928).
Public Service Comm'n of Missouri v. Brasher Freight Lines, 306 U.S.
204 (1939).
18 Pendergist v. United States, 314 U.S. 574 (1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
"
T International Ladies Garment Workers v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304
U.S. 243 (1938).
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and whether the constitutional question is substantial.' If these
criteria are met 'he must certify the case to the chief judge who will
Convene the three judge court. To prevent irreparable damage
though, the single judge can issue a temporary restraining order
to remain in force only until the full hearing,"9 but he cannot deter-
mine the case on the merits.2" If the district judge refuses to order
a three judge court, then mandamus will lie to the Supreme Court.21
If there is no substantial federal question22 or the case is otherwise
improper,23 the single judge may dismiss. His determination of
the existence of a substantial federal question may be appealed to
the court of appeals. 4
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein2 makes two
additional inroads into the field of three judge courts.- Idlewild
first holds that the single district judge cannot decide to abstain.2 ,
Petitioner sold liquor to overseas passengers at an international air
terminal, delivery being made upon the buyer's arrival at his foreign
destination. Being advised by New York state authorities that his
business was illegal under state statutes, petitioner sought to enjoin
enforcement of the statute as being unconstitutional under the com-
1
"Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962)
(per curiam).
' 28 U.S.C. §2284(3) (1958).
20 Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930).
" E.g., Ex Parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940); Stratton v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry., supra note 20.2 2 E.g., Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); German v. South Carolina
Ports- Authority, 295 F.2d 491 (4th Cir. 1961). This includes the deter-
mination that the statute is clearly constitutional or unconstitutional. *See
cases cited notes 8-10 supra.
Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957) (lack of jurisdictional
amount); Harlan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 180 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Pehn.
1960) '(no injunction sought).
24 Bell v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 279 F.2d 853 (2d
Cir. 1960); White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 973 (1958).
-Z 370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per curiam).
2 Equitable abstention is the principle that the "federal courts should
not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to inter-
pretation until the state courts have been afforded reasonable opportunity to
pass on them." Haxrison v. NAACP, 360 -U.S. 167, 176 (1959); accord,
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (complicated state regitlatory
system); Great "Lakes Dredge & Drydock. Co. v... Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943) (state taxation); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312,U.S
496. (1941) (,constitutional questidn with unsettled state law). See Wright,
The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. REv. 815 (1959); Note,
59 CoLum. L. REv. 749 (1959). But see,-.e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), where abstention is exercised in
other than constitutional questions.
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merce clause and the supremacy clause. Petitioner's request for a
three judge court was denied by the district judge on the grounds
that, the federal- court should retain jurisdiction but abstain until.
the question was initially decided by the state courts, even though no.
state action was pending at the time .
7 2
The Supreme Court, in.a per curiam, opinion s held that-the,
decision to abstain is to be, made by three judges because it is a
decision' on the merits and thus improper for a single judge. 9
It can be argued that abstention is a threshold jurisdictional
decision, similar to the substantial question determination 0  There
is- no determination of rights or duties.. Abstention. is simply a
decision that the federal court should not hear the case. Further,
the cases3 ' allowing. the single judge to decide the substantial ques-
tion issue are indicative of a Supreme Court policy to restrict rather
than broaden the use of three judge courts. The convening of a
three judge court is a time consuming and costly process 32 and since
the purpose of the statute is to avoid improvident invalidation of
state statutes, policy reasons favor a single judge deciding the matter
of abstention.3 3  Also abstention is an. area marked by delay and
frustration34 and the convening of three judges adds to the delay.
"Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 188 F. Supp. 434
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
- Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1963)
(per curiam).
" Snyder's Drug Storei,' Inc. v. Taylor, 227 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1955)
holds that a single judge can abstain, but does not give supporting rationale.
A three judge court can abstain. E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959).
, 047 IowA L. Rrv. 534, 537 (1962).
E.-g., Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Baily v. Patterson, 369
U.S. 31 (1962,); notes 9 & 10 supra and accompanying'-text.
32 "[T] he requiremefit of three 'judges, of whom one -must be a Justice
of this Court or a circuit judge, entails a serious drain upon the federal
judicial system particularly in regions where, despite modern facilities, dis-
tance still plays an important part in the administration of justice. And
all but a few of the great metropolitan areas are such regions. Moreover,
inasmuch as this procedure also brings direct review of a district court to
this court,' any loose'-construction 6f the requirements ,of § 266 [§ 2281]
would defeat the purposes of Congress, as expressed in the Jurisdictional
Act of February 1925, to keep within narrov confines our appellate docket."
Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S.'246, 250 (1941).
See 47 IOWA L. REV. 534, 538 (1962).
The 'three-judg6 coiurt called pursuant t6.-the decision in the pfincipal
case refused to abstain because of the delay and expense already 'incurred
by the petitioner. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v.-Epstein,-212 F. Sipp.
376 (S D.N.Y. '1962). But see Government & Civic Employees Organizing
Comm.,, CIO. v. Wiridsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); vhere appellant tvie .reathed
the Supreme Court witout ever, having his case heard.:on -the merits:'
19631.
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Under close examination, however, it becomes apparent that the
substantial question determination and the decision to abstain are
different. The former is to determine if jurisdiction exists, because
a substantial question is a jurisdictional requirement for the con-
vening of a three judge court.35 Also the single judge has no dis-
cretion. If the outcome of the case is clear, he must dismiss.
Abstention presupposes jurisdiction. 8  In abstaining a court
declines, for policy reasons, to hear a case of which it has jurisdic-
tion. The decision to abstain is not automatic but is based on a
weighing of factors.3 This seems a proper function for three
judges, since the statute indicates that the single judge's functions
be almost ministerial in nafure.8
Furthermore, if a substantial question exists, the single judge
should not deny relief to either party. Withholding relief is the
same as granting it. The single judge cannot grant an injunction.
Conversely he should not be able to deny petitioner's request.8 9
Also there is no temptation for the single judge to use abstention
as an excuse to avoid convening a three judge court because the
procedure would disrupt his docket as well as that of the court of
appeals.
The second significant holding of Idlewild deals with appellate
review and restricts the interpretation to be given Stratton v. St.
Louis S.W. Ry.4" In Stratton a district judge granted a temporary
restraining order but later dismissed the bill for want of equity. 41
The court of appeals reversed on the merits, not on the question
of the propriety of three judges. 42  On its own motion the Supreme
Court held that the single judge had no jurisdiction to hear the
case on the merits, a three judge court being proper, and that,
therefore, the court of appeals was without jurisdiction.48
In Idlewild the court of appeals also decided that abstention was
a decision on the merits proper only for a three judge court. How-
ExRz Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426, 429
(1961).
" NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
"S See Bowen, Where are Three Federal Judges Required?, 16 MINN.
L. REv. 1, 17 (1931).
"'Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962)
(per curiam).
40282 U.S. 10 (1930).
,St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Emmerson, 27 F.2d 1005 (S.D. Ill. 1928).
"St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Emmerson, 30 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1929).
,Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930).
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-ever, it thought itself unable to give petitioner relief,"4 holding that
under Stratton it had no jurisdiction, and dismissed.4 5 In doing
so it gave Stratton a broad interpretation and held that it was pre-
cluded from hearing the question of jurisdiction as well as deciding
the merits4 -though admitting it was in the anomalous position of
finding the district court in error and being unable to give relief.
The Supreme Court limited the interpretation to be given
Stratton. Though the per curiam opinion is not explicit, it ap-
parently holds that Stratton is authority only for the point that the
court of appeals cannot decide the merits of an issue within the juris-
diction of a three judge court. Thus, if the court of appeals finds
that the district court had jurisdiction, it can review the merits of
the case; and if it finds that the district judge did not have juris-
diction, it can remand the case with instructions to convene a three
judge court.
Before Idlewild petitioner's only safe course, upon being denied
a three judge court, was to file both a petition for mandamus with
the Supreme Court and an appeal with the court of appeals.4 7 Man-
damus was thought necessary to compel the convening of a three
judge court. Appeal was provident, since if mandamus were denied
petitioner might find that his time for appeal on the merits had
lapsed." Since one or the other would consequently prove unneces-
sary, petitioner bore an expensive burden. Also such a procedural
route resulted in piecemeal determination of the case.49
"Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.
1961).
"' Petitioner started anew and again sought a three judge court but the
second district judge refused to overrule the prior denial of another district
court. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 194 F. Supp. 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
"' There was a split of authority on this question. Some circuits dis-
missed, citing Stratton. Waddell v. Chicago Land Clearing Comm'n, 206
F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1953) (dictum); Riss & Co. v. Hoch, 99 F.2d 553 (10th
Cir. 1938). Other courts vacated the order of the single judge, but apparent-
ly the present question was not squarely faced. Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 266 F.2d 427 (3rd Cir. 1959); Board of Super-
visors v. Tureaud, 207 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1953), vacated on other grounds,
347 U.S. 971 (1959) (per curiam). In Two Guys from Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinley, supra, the first district judge held a three judge
court proper. A second judge dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals
held the second judge was without jurisdiction and vacated his order.
" In Idlewild petitioner sought both certiorari and mandamus. 368 U.S.
812 (1961).
"861 COLUm. L. REv. 1358, 1362 (1961); 47 IowA L. R.v. 534, 541
(1962).
Ibid.
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.As a. result of Idlewild, appeal to the court of appeals now pro-
vides, a complete remedy wheA, a district judge improperly refuses
to convene a three judge court. If the court of appeals finds that
the--single judge did not have jurisdiction, it can proceed with the
merits. If a three judge court is proper, it can be so ordered.
There is no need to delay proceeding by seeking mandamus from
the Supreme Court ffor mandamus does not consider the merits;
it merely orders the convening of a three judge court.
The procedural result of Idlewild is a much needed simplifica-
tion of review procedure. Procedural pitfalls and piecemeal deter-
mination have been eliminated and an uncertain area made uniform
and clear.
CHARLES MONROE WHEDBEE
Pleadings-Alternative Joinder of Defendants
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has again considered
the application of the alternative joinder of defendants statute1 in
Conger v. Travelers Ins. Co.2 Prior to the decision, the status of
the statute was very questionable.3 The instant case has done much
to sweep aside the confusion.
In Conger, the plaintiff alleged alternatively two causes of action.
In. the first clause, plaintiff alleged that she was the named bene-
ficiary of a group life insurance policy issued by the defendant,
Travelers, which policy insured the life of deceased; that the
deceased died while the policy was fully effective; that payment to
fhe plaintiff under the terms of the policy had been refused by
Tiravrelers; and that the plaintiff was entitled to full payment from
Trayelers in the amount of $8000. In the second cause of action,
50 Apparently mandamus is still available, to petitioner. See cases cited
note 21 supra. However, mandamus will usually iot issue where appellate,
reyv-ew is available, even though the Court can, in its discretion, issue the
writ in exceptional and appropriate cases. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318.
U.S. 578 (1943); Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932). in.
Idlewild'the Court granted both certiorari and heard the petition for man-'
d.rpus.. 3,68 U.S. 812'(1961).
-.':'N.C. iRN. STAT. § 1-69 (1953).'
"-"'260 N.C.J l12, 131 S.E.2d 889 (1963).
State x rel Cain r. Corbett, 235 N.C. 33, 69 S.E.2d 20 (1952); Foote
v. C. W. "Davis & Co.,"230 N.C. 422, 53 S.E.2d 311 (1949) (Although the"
cburtr did not construe the irtatute,' it was a case for the application of the
statute.); Peitzman v. Town of Zebulon, 219 N.C. 473, 14 S.E.2d 416
(i941) ;" Smith Iv. Greensboro Joini Stock Land Bank, 213 N.C. 343, 196
S.E. 481 (1938); Grady v. Warren, 201 N.C. 693, 161 S.E. 319 (1931).
[Vol. 42
